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MEASURING THE DURATION OF JUDICIAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGSt
David S. Clark* and John Henry Merryman**
A metho_d of estimating the probable duration of litigation is
useful for a variety of purposes. First, the probable duration of a
case may, to some extent, determine strategy in litigation since prolonged litigation is often perceived as an appreciable cost to one
party and as a benefit to the other. 1 An estimate of the duration
of a criminal case, for example, probably influences the respective
postures of a defendant and a prosecutor in plea bargaining. 2 Similarly, civil litigants may be able to use an estimate of the probable
duration of litigation, together with other factors, in deciding whether
to sue, defend, or settle. 3
Second, a forecast of the probable duration of litigation may help
improve the efficiency of our judicial system. 4 On a general level,

t The authors wish to thank John Barton, Mauro Cappelletti, Lawrence Friedman, Carlos Jose Gutierrez, Alex Inkeles, Fernando Rojas and James Rowles for
their perceptive comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. This article is one
of a series of publications made possible by Grant No. AID/csd-3151 from the United
States Agency for International Development to Stanford Law School.
• Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; Assistant
Director, Studies in Law and Development (SLADE), Stanford Law School. A.B.
1966, J.D. 1969, J.S.M. 1972, Stanford University.-E<i.
•• Nelson Bowman Sweitzer and Marie B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School; Director, Studies in Law and Development (SLADE), Stanford Law
School. B.S. 1943, University of Portland; M.S. 1944, J.D. 1947, Notre Dame;
LL.M. 1951, J.S.D. 1955, N.Y.U.-E<i.
1. According to prevailing economic theory, the estimated measure will improve
the allocation of societal resources to the same extent that it assists parties and
counsel in reaching more accurate strategy decisions. See R. PosNER, EcoNoMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 333· (1972); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL SnmIES 399, 400 (1973).
2. See Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAW & EcoN. 61, 99
(1971); DonVito, An Experiment in the Use of Court Statistics, 56 JUD. 56, 58
(1972).
3. See Landes, supra note 2, at 103, 105; Posner, supra note 1, at 420-21.
4. In two classic studies, court congestion and delay has been called one of -the
most urgent problems facing the legal system. See A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY 112-19 (1961); H. ZlESEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY
IN THE CoURT xxi (1959). The volume of literature addressed to the problem of
court delay has been enormous and is reflected in several recent bibliographies on the
subject. See, e.g., MODERN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 153-75 (R. Fremlin ed. 1973);
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND nm LEGAL PROFESSION 410-75 (F. Klein ed. 1963);
D. TOMPKINS, CoURT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 151-60 (1973); Congestion and Delay in the Courts 1-12 (B. Jackson ed. mimeograph 1971); National
College of the State Judiciary, Congestion and Delay 1-7 (mimeograph 1972);
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such an estimate provides information needed in the formation of
policy for judicial administration. 5 More specifically, it may help
determine the relative efficiency of various courts and administrative
tribunals in adjudfoating different types of cases and thus provide a
valuable aid in assigning cases and staffing courts and tribunals. 0
Finally, the estimate may be useful in the study of law and social
change. The duration of litigation is one quantitative measure of
legal activity that, in combination with other legal, social, economic
and political data, may permit the development of hypotheses about
law and society that can be tested empirically. 7 In this way, an index
Wheeler & Whitcomb, The Literature of Court Administration, 1914 Aruz. ST. L.J.
689, 10S-16.
There are also at least six national organizations currently interested in the question of judicial delay, all of which periodically issue reports or newsletters: The
American Judicature Society, The Federal Judicial Center, The Institute of Judicial
Administration, The Judicial Administration Division of the American Bar Association, The National Center for State Courts, and -The National College of the State
Judiciary. Commissions have been established and specifically directed to examine
the problem. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A.B.A. PRO.JEcr ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE S-31, 40-42 (1968); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
REPORT, STuDY GROUP ON TIIE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT [THE FREUND
REPORT] (1972); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT 80-90 (1967).
The issue of court delay is not unique to the United States. See WORLD AssoCIATION OF JUDGES & INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CENTER, COURT CONGESTION-SoME
REMEDIAL APPROACHES (1971); Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil
Procedure-Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH, L. REV.
847, 8S5-60 (1971).
S. See CoURT CONGESTION AND DELAY (G. Winters ed. 1971). Economists who
analyze court delay argue that it is an omnipresent feature of social life and is not
necessarily an unmitigated evil. These economists argue that the costs of delay
should be balanced against the costs of shortening a court queue. See R. PosNER,
supra note 1, at 35S-S6; Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload,
3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 339, 348 (1974). According to this line of reasoning, minimization of delay alone is not an appropriate formulation of a judicial reform goal. The
goal of a procedural system should be to minimize ·the sum of the cost of erroneous
judicial decisions plus the cost of operating the adjudicative body. See R. POSNER,
supra note 1, at 333; Posner, supra note 1, at 399-400, 448.
6. A duration index could, for example, be used to measure the speed of litigation at several levels in a judicial or administrative hierarchy. Other comparisons
might be made between courts or agencies at the same level, between federal courts
or agencies on the one hand and state bodies on the other, between criminal and
civil cases, and between types of cases decided within any particular court (i.e.,
landlord-tenant disputes as opposed to medical malpractice disputes). See J. REED,
THE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH TO CoURT DELAY (1973).
7. For instance, the Federal Judicial Center recently completed its initial forecasting of federal district court caseloads. Instead of basing caseload predictions on
filing trends from previous years, they were instead founded on the hypothesis that
variations in litigation activity are more accurately signaled by changes in social,
political, economic and demographic indicators. By measuring variations in these
indicators and relating them to changes in filings, the goal is to describe case filing
experience in terms of indicator activity and then to monitor these indicators to
predict litigation activity in the future. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ANNUAL REPORT
191S. Researchers have also analyzed a variety of other factors. See H. ZIESEL,
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of the duration of litigation may prove to be a basic working tool
for an empirical social science of the law. 8
One obvious way to measure the duration of litigation is to determine retrospectively the time it took to dispose of cases. Such a
procedure would generate a string of numbers showing, illustratively,
that one case lasted 17 6 days, another lasted 545 days, and so on. 0
This approach, while adequate for some purposes, is too cumbersome
and too expensive for wide use, and too particular to permit generalization and prediction. A second way to estimate duration is to reduce the duration figures for specific cases to a single summary statistic measuring the mean, median, or modal duration. This procedure,
however, is also too cumbersome, since it frequently requires that
the actual duration of at least enough cases for a statistically valid
sample be determined from uncompiled data in judicial archives.10
H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BucHHOLZ, supra note 4, at 251-62 (forecasting future workloads); Institute of Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study-1974 viii (mimeograph) (relating population concentration to time lapse in personal injury); DonVito,
supra note 2, at 56-58 (explaining urban court congestion using duration as one of
several independent variables); Sykes, Cases, Courts, and Congestion, in LAW IN
CULTURE AND SoclEIY 327, 330-36 (L. Nader ed. 1969). See also Blumstein, Management Science to Aid the Manager, 15 SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 35 (Fall,
1973).
8. The development of a set of such legal measurements is one objective of
SLADE (an acronym for Studies in Law and Development), a comparative study
of law and social change in six nations centered at the Stanford Law School.
The six nations are Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Peru and Spain. Together with the authors and Professor Lawrence Friedman, scholars from each of
these nations participated in the research design. In addition, the national scholars
were primarily responsible for most of the field research, and are now preparing
national monographs in which they present and discuss their results. The national
scholars are Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich (Chile), Fernando Rojas (Colombia),
Carlos Jose Gutierrez (Costa Rica), Sabino Cassese and Stefano Rodota (Italy),
Lorenzo Zolezzi (Peru) and Jose Juan Toharia (Spain).
SLADE is funded under the Agency for International Development Grant No.
AID/csd-3151. A prior Ford Foundation grant to Professor Merryman (Grant No.
700-0355) provided the opportunity for the reading and preliminary thinking that
led to SLADE. For a brief description of SLADE, see Merryman, Comparative Law
and Scientific Explanation, in LAw IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SocIAL
AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 101 (J. Hazard & w. Wagner eds. 1974).
9. One problem is that there is some confusion with regard to what duration
really means. Does a time lapse period for civil matters begin with the filing of a
complaint, the filing of an answer, or from the point at which a case is in issue?
See A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, supra note 4, at 329. For criminal cases, does it
begin with the indictment or information, or from the initial court appearance? See
DonVito, supra note 2, at 58; Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 83, 84 (1975).
10. With few exceptions, record keeping for adjudicative bodies in the United
States is at a primitive stage. DonVito, supra note 2, at 56. The first systematic
data on the average (in this case median) duration of litigation in the United States
was published for the federal courts in 1941. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR
CIRCUIT JUOOES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTS, 1941, at 55-57. Today a median duration is calculated for both civil and criminal cases in United States district courts and courts of
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The equation for estimating the duration of litigation proposed
in this article, in contrast, uses the number of cases pending at the
beginning of a year and the number of cases filed during that year,
data regularly compiled and published in many nations. 11 In deriving this formula, suppose that
appeal. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, supra, 1915, at 290, 297304, 421-37, 479-81.
In 1969, only two states-California and New York-were reported to have
mean or median time lapse data calculated and available. American Judicature Society, The Quality of State Judicial Statistics 2 (Report No. 27, mimeograph, June
1969). Today, the situation is slightly improved with data available for Maryland,
New Jersey and part of Pennsylvania. DonVito, supra note 2, at 58. In other
countries, the authors have been unable to locate published statistics on the average
duration of litigation.
For the past 13 years, the Institute of Judicial Administration has compiled a
comparative analysis of the duration of personal injury cases tried by juries in the
principal trial courts of general jurisdiction in the United States. Using a sample of
cases from each jurisdiction, delay has been measured by calculating the median
elapsed time from the date of service of the answer to the complaint until the date
of trial. Institute of Judicial Administration, supra note 7, at i-ii. Other research
using a sample of cases to study average delay includes France, Order i11 the Courts
Revisited: Progress and Prospects of Controlling Delay in the Tort Jury Litigal/011
Process, 1966-1973, 7 AKRON L. REV. 5, 6-11, 35 (1973) (average delay in tort and
criminal jury trials in various Ohio counties) and A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, supra
note 4, at 120-37 (delay in civil jury cases in seven Pennsylvania counties).
11. Although significant improvement has been made in the United States in the
past ten years, it is still possible to echo the sentiment of Kalven and Zeisel regarding
the "wretched state of judicial statistics." H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZIESEL, THE AMERI·
CAN JURY 12 (1966). The United States Department of Justice recently published
information on those state courts that compile data on the number of cases pending,
the number of new cases filed, and the average elapsed time before cases are terminated. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, I.Aw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AoMINISTRA·
TION, NATIONAL SURVEY OF COURT ORGANIZATION 69-77 (1973). Nevertheless, even
for the most current year available, it would be much easier to do research on litigation delay using the proposed duration of litigation index than to rely on compiled
average elapsed time data. Besides the federal courts, for which both types of information are now available, average elapsed time data is gathered for only 20 per cent
of the state courts, while data on the number of cases filed and pending is compiled
for 73 and 62 per cent of the state courts respectively. Id. at 8.
For historical research, the proposed duration of litigation index would prove
even more useful. Average elapsed time (e.g., median duration) statistics have only
been available since 1941, see note 10 supra, and then only for some federal courts,
However, sufficient information on the number of cases pending and filed for federal courts has been published since 1871 for criminal cases and since 1876 for civil
cases by the Attorney General of the United States (up to 1940) and by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (after 1940). Useful statistics
for state courts were a spinoff of the crime surveys of the 1920s when a few jurisdictions began collecting data. The experience of various states paved the way for the
Bureau of the Census to begin compilation of relevant information until 1946, when
the program was abandoned. See McCafferty, The Need for Criminal Court Statistics, 55 JUD. 194 (1971). An annotated bibliography on historical state court statistics can be found in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND 'IHB LEGAL PROFESSION, supra
note 4, at 265-68.
Outside the United States, the proposed duration of litigation index has been
calculated for various courts in Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Peru and Spain in
conjunction with the SLADE project at Stanford. See note 8 supra. In addition,
Sarat and Grossman report that it is possible to find information on the number of
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=
=

number of cases pending at the beginning of year t;
number of new cases filed during year t;
J
number of cases decided with a final judgment during
year t;12 and
W
number of cases withdrawn or dismissed during year t.
Assuming that J and W are constant,13 then the number of years (D)
required to dispose of (Pt F) cases is 14
D
Pt+ F
(1)
-1

+
=

J+W

If it is further assumed that cases are decided in order of filing, 15
and that the last case for year tis filed on or near December 31,16
then D for year t provides an estimate,· for use in year t
1, of the
number of years -to adjudicate a newly filed case. A new D can be
calculated at the end of each year, thereby compiling a series of D

+

cases filed from the statistical abstracts for Australia, Denmark, Finland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and West Germany. Sarat & Grossman,
Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication, 69
AM. PoL. Ser. REV. 1200, 1208 (1975). Data have been published in England on
the volume of civil and criminal matters since 1858. See LoIU> HIGH CHANCELLOR
REPORT OF THE CoMMITIEE ON CML JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2 n.57 (1968).
12. "Final judgment" refers to a noninterlocutory judgment that disposes of a
case at that level of adjudication. An appeal can be taken from a final judgment
to the next higher level in the adjudicative hierarchy.
13. Actually it is only necessary to assume that the sum of J and W remains
constant, since it is the quantity (J
W) that is the denominator in equation (1).
Thus J and W can vary widely with relation to each other and still provide the same
value for D.
14. A formula employing the same variables has in fact already been developed.
See M. CAPPELLETTI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 126
n.69 (1967); Cappelletti, supra note 6, at 859 n.60.
The formula was as follows:

+

D=
where

D
P1
P2
F

= probable duration of litigation in years;

= number of cases pending at the beginning of the year;
= number of cases pending at the end of the year;
= number of new cases filed during the year;
J = number of cases that reached final judgment during the year; and
W = number of cases withdrawn or dismissed during the year.

It was discarded because it contains a logical defect in the denominator: If (J + W)
remained constant, the duration of litigation would decrease as F increased when
intuitively the contrary result should be reached.
15. Strict queuing, of course, may not be followed. Some cases are given preference by the court and other cases may be deferred by the voluntary action of the
parties with the permission of the court. Either of these occurrences will lessen the
value of D as a guide for litigants. See H. ZIESEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ,
supra note 4, at 45.
16. This assumption is reflected in the (-1) term in equation (1 ), which acts
to subtract one year from D.
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statistics hereinafter called the index of the probable duration of
litigation.
Equation (1) can be simplified. The number of cases pending
at the beginning of the next year (Pt+1) can be expressed as
Pt+l = Pt + F - J - W
(2)
the terms of which can be rearranged to
(3)
J + W =Pt+ F
Substituting (3) into (1) we get

D =

Pt + F - Pt+l
p + F - Pt+l

Pt+ F
Pt+ F - Pt+i

or, in a simplified form,

D

Pt+1
= ------'------Pt+ F - Pt+i

(4)

This final form of the equation is equivalent to

.D -

Pt+l
(5)
-1
W
However, equation (5) is less useful than (4) as a calculating equation because W is generally unavailable.
In other words, we have arrived at a fairly simple notion that D
represents the initial "input" in the current year (Pt+1), or the cases
pending at the end of the prior year, divided by the "output" in the
prior year (J
W). Thus, the equation is in effect an annual inputoutput ratio that estimates the time that should elapse before a
newly filed case will be decided.
It must be recognized that D is an estimate and not the duration
of any particular case. 17 However, its ease of calculation and the
relative availability of the required data make it a highly convenient
index. 18

+

+

17. Measures similar to the one proposed here have previously been used. For
example, Landes was interested in using an econometric model to analyze factors
,that determine the choice between pre-trial settlement and trial within the criminal
justice system. Unable to find adequate data on the median duration (Q) from filing
to judicial disposition of criminal cases for United States district courts for the early
1960s, he devised a proxy variable for Q (which was available for the late 1960s)
that could be computed for the entire longitudinal spectrum in which he was interested. The proxy variable was defined as the ratio of pending cases (P) at the end
of year m-1 to the average number of cases that go to trial (T) in years m and
m-1. The accuracy of PIT as an estimate of median duration (Q) was checked by
running a simple regression of Q on PIT for those years when both series of data
were available. P/T was positively related to Q, accounting for nearly half of the
variation in Q. See Landes, supra note 2, at 86-87.
DonVito, in presenting a set of indicators to measure the dimensions of urban
court congestion, formulated a backlog index, but did not suggest its use as a
measure of average duration. His index was expressed as the ratio of cases pending
at the end of the year (P) to the number of cases terminated for the year (J) or
P /J. See DonVito, supra note 2, at 63.
18. The proposed duration of litigation index (D) appears to be highly correlated
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Although useful for the calculation of D, equation (4) does not
permit a determination of the relationship between J and W. The
value of D is unaffected by the relationship of these variables since
it is the sum of J and W, or Pt
F - Pt+i, that comprises the
denominator of equation (4). It may be helpful, however, to derive
a statistic (R) that shows the number of cases reaching final judgment in a year as a percentage ~f the cases terminated during that
year. A comparison of D and R might then permit some rather
tentative cqnclusions regarding the behavior of litigants as D varies.
The relationship between J and W may be represented by
J
R
J
W
(6)
and R may be termed the "judgment ratio." Substituting (3) into
(6), we have

+

= +

R

=

+

J

Pt
F - Pt+i
(?)
R can vary between one and zero. If R has a value of one, all cases
that were terminated during the year reached final judgment. As
the value of R declines, an increasing proportion of the cases
terminated were withdrawn or dismissed before final judgment. 19 If
R is zero, no cases reached final judgment.
with the median duration statistic that has recently been used for some courts in
the United States. To establish this proposition, D was calculated for the eleven
United States courts of appeal on an annual basis for the five-vear period of 19701974. By carrying out a simple regression for D and the median duration figures
given for the same courts, an R2 of 0.54 was calculated. D, as a proxy variable,
thus explains in this case 54 per cent of the variation in figures of median duration
of litigation. For the duration data, see U.S. ADMINISTR.ATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES CoURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, 1974, at 1-11.
There is more about the relationship between D and recent measures of median
duration that is interesting. For the eleven courts of appeal mentioned above, the
mean of all D's was 15 per cent larger than the mean for all median duration figures.
A Similar relationship has been found between the true mean of elapsed time (duration) for the disposition of cases and the median duration. See A. LEVIN & E.
WOOLLEY, supra note 4, at 311; Comment, Local Procedure and Judicial Efficiency:
A Comparative Empirical Study of Texas Metropolitan District Courts, 49 TEXAS
L. REv. 677, 686 (1971). The mean is almost always greater than the median as a
summary statistic of duration figures (in other wotds, the CUI'Ve is skewed to the
right). That is, most court cases are processed in a relatively short period while a
substantial minority take much longer periods of time. From the relationships observed, it appears that D is closer to a true mean than to a median measure of the
average duration of litigation.
19. A great deal of care must be used when comparing J and W data across
jurisdictions, especially transnationally. For example, in United States civil courts,
the number of cases filed (F) over a period of years generally equals the number of
cases listed as terminated (J + W). Since neither J nor W is reported separately,
W cannot be calculated. However, in Italy, the number of cases decided over a
period of years is less than the number of cases filed. It is possible, therefore, to
calculate W from the official statistics where Pt, Pt+l• F, and J are known, since
W
Pt+ F - Pt+l - J. The same care in guaranteeing the comparability of

=
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To illustrate the application of our equations, we have collected
in Table 1 statistics on the number of cases filed, decided, and pending in Italian preture, courts of general civil jurisdiction over claims of
moderate amounts, 20 for each year from 1947 to 1970.

t

Year

TABLE 1
CML LITIGATION IN ITALIAN PRETIJRE, 1947-1970
D
F
J
Pt
Pt-1-1
-Cases PendingDuration of
Beginning
End of
Litigation
Cases
Cases
of Year
Index
Year
Filed
Decided

R
Judgment
Ratio

0.37
0.34
0.34
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.40
0.40
0.35
0.38
0.40
0.40
0.39
0.43
0.43
0.40
0.39
0.39
0.40
0.45
0.38
0.44
0.44
1.55
0.43
1.51
Source: lsnTUTO CENTRALE DI STATISTICA, ANNUARIO STATISTICO ITALIANO [19471949); ISTITUTO CENTRALE DI STATISTICA, ANNUARIO DI STATISTICHE
GIUPIZIARIE [1950-1970].

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

136548
176642
203489
172411
226744
232901
216810
221555
253374
247800
229741
224013
206081
205930
198674
202572
215200
213245
199259
191780
212453
209466
215148
222748

42578
49425
58360
59283
79094
82484
88717
94005
93366
90754
88141
85529
82916
80304
77691
75079
75746
74913
82026
83096
79129
89665
89720
89907

76632
99181
129022
160488
172234
188645
207585
202583
190754
178924
188639
198868
209823
203299
224183
240836
257488
277671
297853
290699
298481
303416
308347
317806

99181
129022
160488
172234
188645
207585
202583
190754
178924
188639
198868
209823
203299
224183
240836
257488
277671
297853
290699
298481
303416
308327
317806
330560

0.87
0.88
0.93
1.07
0.90
0.97
0.91
0.82
0.67
0.79
0.91
0.98
0.96
1.21
1.32
1.38
1.42
1.54
1.41
1.62
1.46
1.51

As Table 1 shows, there were 317,806 civil cases on the dockets of

all preture at the beginning of 1970 (Pt), 222,748 cases filed during
that year (F), and 330,560 cases still pending on December 31,
1970 (Pt+1). Applying equation ( 4), and recognizing its underlying assumptions, a civil litigant in a case filed in 1971 could expect
to wait 1.57 years for final adjudication. 21
The judgment ratio (R) describes the relationship between the
two output variables J and W. Since we know Pt+i, Pt, F, and J
from Table 1, W can be determined from an equation derived earlier: 22
J and W must be exercised when trying to control for cases plea bargained or dismissed in penal litigation.

20. In the 1960s, this jurisdiction included most cases in which the amount at
issue was under 1200 dollars. See M. CAPPELLETTI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO,
supra note 14, at 79.
21. To the extent information is available for individual ¢0urts, or subgroups of
the total number of courts, calculation of D would be more useful for a particular
litigant deciding whether to sue, settle or defend.
22. See equation (3) supra.
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In 1970, for example, we find that 120,087 cases were settled before
final judgment, withdrawn, or allowed to lapse for other reasons.
Using equation (7), we derive a judgment ratio of 0.43, which
means that forty-three per cent of the cases terminated by preture
in that year reached final judgment.
We would normally expect D to vary with changes in the number
of cases filed (F), the number of cases adjudicated (J), or the number of cases terminated before adjudication 0N). The relationship
among these variables may be studied in reference to data from
Table 1 that correspond to the two "peaks" in the graph of D from
1947 to 1970 that, together with a graph of R for the same period,
is shown in Figure 1 ( on page 98) .
The first peak in D occurred in 1950 when the index of duration
measured 1.07, an increase from 0.88 in 1948. In the first year
of this two-year period, an increase in D from 0.88 to 0.93 is associated with an increase of 26,847 in F and a smaller increase of
8,935 in J. Further, R remained constant from the previous year
at 0.34, which according to equation ( 6), means there was an increase
in W as well as in J. From 1949 to 1950, however, the increase
in D from 0.93 to 1.07 is associated with a decrease in F and again
a slight increase -in J, unlike ilie situation in the preceding year
where D, J and F all increased. This difference is associated with
a rise in the R curve from 1949 to 1950 as the percentage of cases
that reached final judgment increased from 0.34 to 0.37. In other
words, according to equation (6), there was a decline in the percentage of cases dismissed, withdrawn, or allowed to lapse. The
increase in J may suggest that judges in the preture worker longer
hours or more efficiently. The decrease in W, which can be calculated by slightly rearranging the terms in equation (3), over the
two-year period may suggest that litigants were less willing to settle
their disputes.
The second peak in the duration index is reached in 1966, following a decade-long increase in D. From 1955 to 1966, an
increase in D from 0.67 to 1.62 is associated with decreases in F
from 253,374 to 191,780, and in J from 93,366 to 83,096. The
increase in D is logically associated with a decrease in F since we
might expect fewer new cases to be filed as litigants become less
willing to shoulder the costs of protracted litigation. Further, we
might also logically have expected D to decline as F dropped. Yet
just the opposite result is observed since R increases from 0.35 to 0.45
as J decreases. This means W must have declined at a faster rate
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FIGURE 1
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than J. The number of cases that reached final judgment could have
decreased due to a reduction in the number of judges and staff or
the size of the budget. The increase in R, on the other hand, could
have been caused by changes in the rules of procedure or shifts in
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the attitudes of judges, lawyers and litigants toward the judicial
process.
_
A method of estimating the probable duration of litigation in
judicial and administrative proceedings has been presented. It
should be useful to attorneys and their clients in developing litigation
strategy, to judges and administrators staffing tribunals, to reformers
formulating policy for judicial administration, and to social scientists
studying the interface between society and legal change.

